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STATEMENT O F JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(a), UTAH
CODE ANN.

(1953, as amended).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes are determinative of the issues presented in this appeal:
31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury protection.
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection coverage:
*

*

*

(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an automobile accident
occurring . . . while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident occurring in Utah
involving the described motor vehicle.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-308 (1990).

31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection.
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy
which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for
general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an
automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one or more of the
following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective
findings;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or

(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may
only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another motor
vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a
resident family member of the insured and not insured under the policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured
motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the insured or
while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his
injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any
motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to
any of the foregoing; or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or
other hazardous properties of nuclear materials.
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which may be
contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced
by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a result of
an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar
2

statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive from the
United States or any of its agencies because that person is on active duty in the
military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, including
those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by the policy
insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31 A-22-307 shall be made on
a monthly basis as expenses are incurred.
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after
the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses
incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire
claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within
30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of the
remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also
overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer.
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear
interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month after the due date.
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover
the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action
to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to the
following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally liable for
the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under
personal injury protection have been paid by another insurer, including the
Workers1 Compensation Fund created under Chapter 33, the insurer of the
person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; and
3

(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be
decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-309 (2000).1

31A-21-106, Incorporation by reference.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), an insurance policy may not contain
any agreement or incorporate any provision not fully set forth in the policy or in an
application or other document attached to and made a part of the policy at the time of
its delivery, unless the policy, application, or agreement accurately reflects the terms
of the incorporated agreement, provision, or attached document.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-21-106 (1995).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:
Did the Court of Appeals Err by Failing to Give Effect to
Section 309(4) and by Applying the Inapposite Section 309(6)?
The dispute between Regal and Canal does not center on the "legal liability" of
their respective insureds. Instead, the dispute lies in Canal's stubborn coverage
conclusion and its primary obligation to provide PIP benefits.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other
policy . . . , primary coverage is given by the policy insuring the
motor vehicle in use during the accident.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-309(4).

1

Regal has provided the text of section 309 as it exists today. Changes made
since 1995 were not substantive.
4

Section 309(6)(a), on the other hand, relates to "legal liability" and applies
where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom
[PIP] benefits... have been paid by another insurer . . . the
insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall
reimburse the other insurer for the payment....
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-309(6)(a) (emphasis added).

And Section 309(6)(b) then mandates arbitration for "the issue of liability for
that reimbursement...." It does not mandate (or even permit) arbitration for a
determination of coverage issues or the enforcement of Section 309(4). Therefore, the
assertion by the Court of Appeals that "of course" the parties can arbitrate simply
ignores the plain language of the statute in favor of vague and inaccurate
generalizations.

Did the Court of Appeals Misinterpret Ivie Based Upon
an Inaccurate Understanding of the Word
"Subrogation" and the Scope of "Reimbursement"?
The Court of Appeals claimed that the "cardinal principle" of Ivie applies to this
case despite the drastically different facts of this case. See Opinion f 9. The Ivie court
did not abrogate all rights of subrogation. Instead, it reasoned that equity was not the
source of the direct right of reimbursement provided by Section 309(6) because the
insureds into whose "shoes" the PIP carriers would "step" were stripped of their rights
and obligations. See Allstate Insurance Company v. Ivie. 606 P.2d 1197,1202-03
5

(Utah 1980).
In other words, equity does not dictate that a PIP carrier may not step into the
insured's shoes and pursue the insured's negligence claims; instead, the insured has no
negligence claims and the tortfeasor is not, in fact, a tortfeasor. This is why the Ivie
court correctly ruled that "Allstate ha[d] no right of subrogation to the recovery of
Ivie...."

Did the Court of Appeals Ignore the Practical Effects of
its Decision?
Regal and all other secondary PIP carriers will now refuse to provide PIP
benefits to their insureds. The Court of Appeals made it very clear that Regal should
have forced Christina Chatwin to spend several years suing Canal over its
wrongheaded coverage decision before providing her with PIP benefits. See Opinion
If 11. Compliance with the wishes expressed by the Court of Appeals will be in the
form of denials by every secondary carrier unless or until the insured has fully
litigated the primary carrier's denial.

OPINION O F THE COURT O F APPEALS
Regal Insurance Co. v. Canal Ins. Co.. 2002 UT App 27, 440 Utah Adv. Rep. 19.

6

STATEMENT O F THE CASE
1.

Defendant Canal Insurance Company insured Allen Cermack d/b/a

KC Trucking and his 1995 Transcraft flatbed semi-trailer.
2.

The insured semi-trailer is a "motor vehicle" as defined by UTAH CODE

ANN. § 41-12a-103(4)(a).
3.

Plaintiff Regal Insurance Company insured Christina Chatwin.

4.

On or about November 11,1995 at or about State Street and 1200 North,

Orem, Utah, Christina Chatwin was a pedestrian who was standing on the curb when
she was struck by Canal's insured semi-trailer.
5.

Christina Chatwin was injured as a result of the above-described incident

which "occurred] in Utah [and] involv[ed] [Canal's] insured motor vehicle."
CODE ANN.

UTAH

§ 31A-22-308(3).

6.

Christina Chatwin incurred medical expenses.

7.

Regal paid the PIP benefits (medical expenses) to which Christina Chatwin

was entitled in the sum of $3,000.00.
8.

Canal, at all times material hereto, insured Christina Chatwin for PIP

coverage pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-22-308(3), -309(4) because Christina
Chatwin was a pedestrian who was injured in an accident involving Canal's insured
motor vehicle.

7

9.

Canal's obligation to provide PIP coverage to Christina Chatwin for the

above-described accident and injuries was primary (and Regal's obligation was
secondary) pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309(4).
10.

Canal was and is required to pay said PIP benefits to its insured, Christina

Chatwin, within 30 days of receiving reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss
or expense incurred pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-309(5)(a).
11.

Christina Chatwin provided reasonable proof of her PIP expenses to

Canal, by and through her subrogee Regal, on or about July 22, 1997.
12.

The district court properly ordered Canal to pay interest and attorney fees

to its insured (i.e., her subrogee) because it failed and refused to pay PIP benefits
when due pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-309(5)(c)-(d).
13.

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed February 7, 2002 and

vacated the district court's rulings and judgment.

SUMMARY O F THE ARGUMENT
Christina Chatwin was injured when she was struck (as a pedestrian) by a
semi-trailer insured by Canal. The district court correctly held that although owners of
semi-trailers may choose to refrain from purchasing PIP coverage (i.e., opt out)
pursuant to subsection 302(2), Canal's insured (i.e., the owner of the semi-trailer)
purchased PIP coverage from Canal (i.e., opted in). Therefore, Canal was obligated to
8

provide PIP benefits to Christina Chatwin. Canal's duty to provide PIP benefits to
Christina Chatwin arose from the fact that Canal was paid insurance premiums. Canal
claims that the obligations it undertook in exchange for the insurance premiums were
limited by a definition clause which, it asserts, extinguished PIP coverage for
pedestrians injured by the use of the semi-trailer.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Regal had no right to enforce Christina
Chatwin5s right to recover PIP benefits from Canal. It reasoned that subrogation was
replaced by intercompany arbitration; therefore, Regal's only remedy was arbitration.
The truth is that Regal accrued to all the rights of Christina Chatwin, and Regal
(hereinafter "Christina Chatwin") seeks to enforce her rights under Canal's insurance
policy. Christina Chatwin does not seek to apportion fault to the person who is or
would be held legally liable. This is not a negligence case or a case based on
negligence principles. This case involves a determination of insurance coverage for
Christina Chatwin. Canal may not rely upon Section 309(6) simply by asserting that,
under different facts and circumstances, such section is normally applicable as
between insurers while ignoring that this is a case between Christina Chatwin and her
PIP carrier — Canal — pursuant to Section 309(4).

9

ARGUMENT
I.

PROPERLY PARSING SECTION 309(6) DEMONSTRATES
WHY IT DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

The Court of Appeals failed to fully analyze the issues upon which it ruled. The
court appears to have seen nothing more than the words "insurers/' "arbitration," and
"subrogation." Because the court skipped to a quick conclusion, it achieved an
erroneous result. Appellate courts often beg off a full analysis on the basis of, for
example, a "needless advisory opinion" explanation. This tendency to provide
conclusions which stem from inadequate analysis leads to Utah's insurance law
jurisprudence being, at times, random.2
While this seeming arbitrariness tends to favor insurers in the particular cases,
insurers end up being on both sides of every debate so a court's misplaced compassion
in a particular case rarely results in a net-beneficial result. Instead, it tends to create

2

See, e.g.. Pollard v. Truck Insurance Exchange. 2001 UT App 120 (holding
that only the named insured was entitled to Uninsured Motorist benefits, while
ignoring (1) that the named insured was a corporation, (2) that UM benefits only
cover "bodily injury," and (3) that a corporation, by definition, cannot suffer bodily
injury because it is an incorporeal legal fiction. It is highly unlikely that the
corporation had a meeting of the minds regarding its payment of hundreds or
thousands of dollars in premiums to protect itself against bodily injury. The court
could have engaged in a reformation analysis. The court could have engaged in an
analysis of agency to discover whether the shareholder was acting as the corporation
and thus entitled to coverage. Instead, the court failed to do anything thereby creating
an unconscionable result and some very unhelpful precedent.).
10

arbitrary guidelines. The lack of predictability in the law prevents insurers from
knowing their obligations and results in additional litigation adding new and
unnecessary costs to be passed on to consumers in the form of higher premiums. The
simple fact is that next week Regal could be in Canal's position and Canal could be in
Regal's position. Insurers and insureds are united in their need for predictability.
Each opinion can form the basis for decades of claims adjusting in reliance upon the
opinion. The incorrect opinion of the Court of Appeals would cost Regal very little in
this particular case, but it will cost the industry and the citizens of this state untold
sums over the course of the next decade.
Proper legal analysis requires a complete analysis rather than mere assumptions.
Therefore, Regal will fully explain not only why and how the Court of Appeals erred,
but also how the entire no-fault statute works so that this Court will not be misled by
any dazzling-superficiality.
Section 309(6) creates a remedy which resembles subrogation and is a
substitute for subrogation. Because it only applies to debates regarding the relative
fault of the insurers' respective insured, it does not apply where relative fault is not the
subject matter of the dispute. See Jensen v. Eddv. 514 P.2d 1142,1143 (Utah 1973)
("If the reason for the rule is not present, the rule does not apply."). The plain
language of Section 309(6) limits its application.

11

Intercompany arbitration is mandated:
where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid
by another insurer,... the insurer of the person who would be
held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable;
and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the
insurers.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31 A-22-309(6). Apparently, the foregoing has the potential to

contuse. Therefore, it should be more comprehensible on a clause-by-clause basis.
a. "where the insured"
This clause identifies the erstwhile tortfeasor. The person who is later identified
as the person who "would be" held legally liable for negligence. Note: it does not say
"the insured vehicle;" rather it identifies the person whose insurance may or may not
be associated with the vehicle involved in causing the injury. Because liability
coverage, like PIP coverage, is a floating coverage, the legislature identified the
would-be tortfeasor himself rather than focusing on insured vehicles.
These three words indicate the scope of the arbitration provision: "where the
insured . . . " means that the arbitration clause applies only to the situation
subsequently described. Regal is not blaming Canal's insured for the injury to Ms.

12

Chatwin. Instead, Ms. Chatwin was Canal's insured. The first few words of section
309(6) reveal the Court of Appeals's error.
b.

"under the policy"

This clause identifies the erstwhile tortfeasor's insurance policy. The Court
must understand that status as "insured under the policy" does not relate to the
insuring clause contained in Section 308 because a person is an insured under Section
308 only when they are injured in an accident involving a motor vehicle. Instead of
relating to the no-fault endorsement, this clause's use of "the policy" must refer to
liability coverage required under Section 303 which compels an insurer to "insure" the
erstwhile tortfeasor "using" a motor vehicle which was "involved" in the accident.
c. "is or would be held legally liable"
This clause recognizes both the no-fault immunity and the tort threshold of
Section 309(1). If the tortfeasor is held legally liable in an action between the victim
and the tortfeasor, such a finding would be analyzed under principles of issue
preclusion in intercompany arbitration; therefore, the legislature used the present tense
of the verb "to be" ("is") followed by the disjunctive conjunction "or."
However, where the insured retains immunity, the conditional tense "would be"
is appropriate because it sets forth a condition which is contrary to fact. The insured
tortfeasor is immune from suit regardless of his insurer's obligation of direct

13

reimbursement. The erstwhile tortfeasor is in no sense liable for payment of PIP
expenses, thus his or her liability coverage does not apply to the liability carrier's
direct right of reimbursement. This is true even though tort principles are tangentially
involved and even though the insurer who owes reimbursement under Section 309
must be identified pursuant to Section 303.
In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court expressed surprise that insurers believed prior
to Allstate v. Ivie that intercompany reimbursement was a "subrogation" principle.
See Simonson v. Travis. 728 P.2d 999, 1001 (Utah 1986) ("Apparently before this
Court decided [Ivie ], the concept prevailed that a no-fault carrier had subrogation
rights against the liability insurance carrier of the driver at fault."). This Court must
understand that the concept still prevails because of PIP carriers' misunderstanding of
the interplay between liability coverage and PIP coverage. It is not that insurers, like
the Court of Appeals, are unwilling to recite the anti-subrogation mantra. Rather, the
hollowness of the words fail to communicate any understanding.
The prevailing attitude in intercompany arbitration is that if PIP expenses are
simply labeled "not reasonable and necessary," then those expenses are not
recoverable. The justification for the failure of recovery is that the PIP carrier that
paid the "not reasonable and necessary" PIP benefits to its insured "should not have
paid those expenses." Therefore, claims adjustors are trained in the unsupervised

14

forum that their employers "should not pay" PIP benefits that might be challenged in
intercompany arbitration as "not reasonable and necessary" expenses. This idea is an
apocryphal off-shoot of the "voluntary"3 component of subrogation. See part e, infra.
The "voluntariness" confusion is exacerbated again by additional
poorly-understood "subrogation" ideas which lead some insurers to believe that the
tortfeasor's liability coverage-limit restricts intercompany reimbursement obligations.
These insurers ignore the fact that their insureds are immune from suit for the adverse
carrier's PIP expenses. Therefore, liability coverage is not triggered and cannot form
the basis for the insurer's obligation to reimburse the insurer of the victim. The risk
clause of liability coverage promises indemnification for the sums the insured is
"legally obligated to pay." Because the erstwhile tortfeasor cannot be "legally
obligated to pay," the liability coverage is not triggered and, therefore, the coverage
limits of that coverage cannot affect the insurer's direct obligation to reimburse the

3

This means that public policy favors both the payment of some
undeserving insureds and the overpayment of some disputed claims.
One support for this public policy norm is the desire to encourage the
insurance industry to finance losses. This aspect of the public will
requires that insurers be permitted to recover by subrogation
colorable claims paid, even if, in the end, these claims were not, strictly
speaking covered.

74 Tex. L. Rev. 1361, Quinn, Michael Sean (reviewing Subrogation. Restitution, and
Indemnification The Law of Subrogation. Mitchell, Charles (Oxford University Press
1994)).
15

other insurer.
Ivie recognized the distinction between liability coverage and PIP coverage. Its
conclusions were well-founded. The decision's apparent shortcoming is its implied
assumption that the readers of the decision would have the same base level of
understanding the members of that Court had.
Ivie held that Allstate's attempt to recover its expenses from its insured's
recovery from the tortfeasor's insurer under its liability coverage was wrongheaded.
Because Ivie's recovery consisted of the amount of the tortfeasor's legal liability and
because the tortfeasor's legal liability did not include the PIP expenses incurred by
Allstate, Allstate's assertion that Ivie recovered its expenses was declared to be
incorrect.
Moreover, because the erstwhile tortfeasor is not legally liable, an insurer which
"steps in the shoes" of the tortfeasor is likewise immune from any subrogation action
brought by the insurer of the victim which "steps in the shoes" of the victim whose
rights were abrogated. Thus, the right of subrogation was not directly abrogated as the
Court of Appeals and Tracy R. Barrus seem to believe. Instead, the right of
subrogation was, in military parlance, collateral damage. The particular remedy was
undermined rather than being abrogated. Subrogation's demise, in the narrow sense it
was eliminated, was a secondary effect because its underpinnings were eliminated —

16

not because the insurer of an injured person is "not subrogated" to the rights of the
injured party. Opinion at f 7.
d. "for the personal injuries sustained by any person"
This clause relates to the injuries sustained by the person identified in the
insuring clause — Section 308 — which "involved" a motor vehicle.
e. "to whom benefits required under personal injury
protection"
This clause identifies the expenses which are recoverable in arbitration. For
example, some insurers fail to conduct an analysis of the "reasonable value" of certain
medical expenses under the Relative Value Study. The amounts paid in excess of the
"reasonable value" are not recoverable because they are not benefits "required" under
PIP coverage. The ability to deny reimbursement for expenses which were not
"required" should not be confused with unlawful tort defenses which are raised as a
result of industry confusion and vague assertions. See part c, supra.
Likewise, the amounts in excess of the minimum statutory coverage limits
should be excluded from 309(6) arbitration under the above-quoted language because
they are not "required" benefits. Those amounts may be recoverable, but they are
recoverable under subrogation principles from the tortfeasor's liability coverage. This
is true because the insured tortfeasor is not immune from suit for special damages in
excess of the tort threshold. Moreover, the injured victim's right to recover special
17

damages from the tortfeasor was not abrogated by the no-fault statute. Therefore, PIP
carriers that offer increased limits (above $3,000) do so with the understanding that
recovery of such excess PIP-type expenses may be barred by its insured's exhaustion
of the tortfeasor's liability coverage limits and are only recoverable under traditional
subrogation principles.
f. "have been paid by another insurer"
By installing this clause, the legislature encouraged insurers to immediately
"pay" PIP benefits because payment is a condition precedent to the right of
reimbursement. See, e.g.. Regal Insurance Co. v. Bott 2001 UT 71 at f 11, 31 P.3d
524 ("PIP benefits are intended to provide immediate compensation without having to
bring a lawsuit for out-of-pocket expenses

"). This principle is similar to

"indemnity against loss" under the common law. It also limits participation in the
intercompany reimbursement mechanism to "insurers."
g, "the insurer of the person who would be held legally
liable"
This clause must be reconciled with the clauses analyzed above in sections (a),
(b), and (c). As alluded to above, the insurer of the erstwhile tortfeasor must be
identified from the liability coverage on the vehicle even though the liability coverage
is not the source of the insurer's direct duty to reimburse the other PIP carrier.
Canal is not alleged to be "the insurer of the person who would be held legally
18

liable." Canal is alleged to be the primary PIP carrier for Christina Chatwin. Again,
because Section 309(6) does not apply to this case, it cannot limit Regal's rights.
h. "shall reimburse the other insurer for the payment"
This clause provides a clear requirement that one insurer "shall" be responsible
for PIP expenses incurred by the insurer of the less-culpable party. It also makes clear
that the obligation to pay is a direct obligation rather than a contractual obligation to
answer for the legal liability of the insured tortfeasor.
Imagine a scenario where the tortfeasor carries insurance with minimum
coverage limits. An injured victim may receive up to $23,300.00 under his or her PIP
coverage. If the injured insured obtains reimbursement from his or her own PIP
carrier which approaches the tort threshold, the PIP carrier for the victim knows the
tortfeasor's coverage limits and incorrectly believes that it will not be able to recover
any of its PIP expenses from the liability carrier for the erstwhile tortfeasor because of
the tortfeasor's low coverage limits which will probably be exhausted by the victim
may attack its own insured through tort defenses and "independent" reviews of
medical treatment. Under this mistaken belief of "subrogation" (which insurers are
willing to characterize as "reimbursement" while employing subrogation principles),
the insurer of the victim often denies PIP coverage to the victim and attempts to
interfere with its insured's medical treatment in order to preserve the liability carrier's
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coverage limits for its own reimbursement.4 When this intimidation occurs, the PIP
carrier always wins the war which should never be fought. There is no need, as a
matter of law, for PIP carriers to be concerned with the tortfeasor's coverage limits
because the duty to reimburse is a direct, statutory duty arising from the issuance of
PIP coverage.
The reality is that PIP carriers refuse to pay PIP benefits to their insureds
because the intercompany arbitration system refuses to provide the remedy mandated
by the legislature and the Court system is impotent to force them to act properly.
Similarly, secondary PIP carriers will take advantage of the Court of Appeals's refusal
to implement the legislature's intent unless this Court provides proper guidance.
In addition to injuring already-injured insureds, the foregoing practices distort
insurance premiums. By way of example, if one assumes that the insureds of high-risk
carriers are more likely to be the tortfeasors and insureds of preferred carriers are more
likely to be the victims, one may understand the effect of these bad procedures on the
insurance industry. If high-risk carriers can limit their total exposure to a $25,000
liability coverage limit by insisting that the PIP reimbursement obligation is subsumed
by the liability coverage limitation, high-risk carriers can thereby shift the exposure to

4

This is probably why Professor Keeton, in his seminal 1973 law review
article analyzing Utah's no-fault statute, considered the retention of fault to be illconceived.
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the preferred carriers who insure the victims. Because the preferred carriers cannot
recover their PIP expenses, they are required to pass those costs on to their insureds.
High-risk carriers can pass on the savings of being protected from their direct
obligations. These circumstances result in distorted premium assessments and force
good drivers to subsidize the insurance premiums of less-cautious drivers.
i. "but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable"
This clause is the source of a lot of confusion. Recoverable by whom?
Recoverable how? Recoverable under what rules? The best explanation is that
because intercompany arbitration is a substitute for subrogation and seeks to determine
"legal liability," the arbitration follows the tort process. This conclusion is supported
by Section 309(6)(b) as explained below.
j . "that the issue of liability for that reimbursement
and its amount"
This clause answers the question of the amount "recoverable" by the insurer of
the victim. The amount recoverable is determined according to tort principles. The
PIP carriers must pay PIP benefits to their insureds according to the contract which
vests discretion in the insureds and does not permit tort defenses5 such as "reasonable
5

We reject C.T.'s argument that the Personal Injury
Payment ("PIP") made by his own insurer establishes the
threshold amount for his medical expenses [pursuant to
subsection 309(1)]. The mere fact that his PIP insurer paid
21

and necessary," "caused by," "related to," or "pre-existing condition." However, the
insurer's right of reimbursement from the other insurer is subject to tort principles.
This means that the insurers may challenge the comparative fault of their respective
insureds, the proximate causation of injuries claimed to have been suffered as a result
of the accident, and the amount of injuries and damages which would have been
recoverable in a tort case. Frequently, insurers wait for the tort litigation of the
underlying claims in order to determine (under issue preclusion principles) the amount
which is or would be owed by the tortfeasor to the victim. In fact, many insurers are
signatories to intercompany arbitration agreements which require all signatories to
await the outcome of the underlying tort litigation. That agreement, to which Regal is
a signatory, is not applicable to this case because Canal is not a signatory.
k. "shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration
between the insurers9'
This clause recognizes that the adoption of tort principles could clog the court
system by presenting manifold tort defenses. It would make no sense to do away with
for medical expenses which the jury found were not
related to the accident should not be binding on Johnson
for purposes of establishing the medical expenses threshold
and exposing Johnson to liability for general damages.
This is especially so since a PIP carrier has a first party
contractual relationship with its insured — in this case C.T.
— and owes certain duties to him.
C.T. v. Johnson. 1999 UT 35, 977 P.2d 479 at n.3.
22

tort defenses for the insureds relating to the receipt of PIP benefits while maintaining
the same standards and corresponding volume of litigation between insurers. Much of
the cost advantages of the partial replacement for the tort system would be eliminated
by the subsequent infighting between insurers. This situation would be inconsistent
with the purpose of a no-fault system. Instead of providing insurers with a
subrogation right in the court system, the legislature provided a similar remedy while
simultaneously providing a forum where simplicity could reign.

II.

CANAL'S PIP COVERAGE OBLIGATION IS PRIMARY;
THEREFORE, REGAL IS SUBROGATED TO CHATWIN'S
RIGHTS TO RECEIVE PIP BENEFITS FROM CANAL.

The dispute between Regal and Canal does not center on the "legal liability" of
their respective insureds which is the focus of the intercompany arbitration clause.
Instead, the dispute lies in Canal's stubborn coverage conclusion and its primary
obligation to provide PIP benefits which is the subject of the other insurance clause.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other
policy . . . , primary coverage is given by the policy insuring the
motor vehicle in use during the accident.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-309(4).

The question of whether subrogation exists with respect to this clause does not
depend on some vague assertions made in some law student's review of a somewhat
inapposite legal opinion. Instead, the analysis revolves around the rights possessed by
23

the alleged subrogee and necessarily includes an analysis of the rights possessed by
the alleged subrogor. See generally Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel 2002 UT 62
at f 22 ("The insurer succeeds to the insured's cause of action against a responsible
third party."). Accordingly, the focus by the Court of Appeals on the actions of
Christina Chatwin rather than her rights against Canal was error.
It is undisputed that Christina Chatwin was injured by the semi-trailer which
was insured by Canal. Therefore, it is undiputed that Canal's coverage6 was primary.
Because Canal has a statutory obligation to Christina Chatwin, she possesses the right
to obtain PIP benefits from Canal. Because her rights are not abrogated or voided by
virtue of RegaPs payment, Regal now possesses those rights. Because Regal now
possesses Christina Chatwin's rights, Regal may enforce those rights.

III.

INTER-COMPANY REIMBURSEMENT AND THE
MANDATORY, BINDING ARBITRATION MECHANISM
ARE DESIGNED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE RIGHT OF
SUBROGATION WHICH WAS EXTINGUISHED BY THE
NO-FAULT STATUTE.

This case does not involve a determination of which insurance company's
insured is liable (or comparatively more liable). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-

6

Because this Court only reviews the Opinion of the Court of Appeals rather
than the ruling of the district court, the coverage obligation of Canal is undisputed.
Regal notes that the district court's opinion would be settled under principles of issue
preclusion if the parties were to return to arbitration.
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309(6)(b). This case is a coverage dispute. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 1997).
This case involves a determination of coverage obligations undertaken by two
insurance companies. This case does not involve the issue of legal liability. See, e.g..
Meadow Vallev Contractors v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.. 2001 UT App 190 atfflf1215, 423 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (explaining the trigger-of-coverage "arising out o f and
comparing it to the trigger-of-coverage "legal liability"). It involves Canal's refusal to
provide PIP benefits for its insured.
Because Canal is Christina Chatwin's insurance company, she may apply to
Canal for PIP benefits and enforce all of her rights set forth in the no-fault statute.
Christina Chatwin's rights are not extinguished by the fact that Regal has paid the
benefits which were due her. See, e^., State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Northwestern National Ins. Co.. 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996): see also DuBois v. Nve.
584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978) ("The collateral source rule provides that a wrongdoer
is not entitled to have damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the
plaintiff has received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from an
independent collateral source.").
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IV.

ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ARE
MANDATORY.

Attorney fees and prejudgment interest at the rate of 1 Vz% per month are
provided for in the no-fault statute. These sections are mandatory in order to avoid
undermining the legislative goal that PIP benefits be paid to insureds "immediate[ly].
.. without having to bring a lawsuit." Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos.. 842 P.2d
865 (Utah 1992).
Because Canal refused to pay the PIP benefits it owed to Christina Chatwin,
Regal was forced to initiate litigation, and Canal is obligated to pay the penalties7 set
forth in the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A22-309(5)(c)-(d). Timely payment of PIP benefits, and the concomitant obligation to
pay the statutory penalties, is not permissive; rather both obligations are mandatory as
evidenced by the language employed by the legislature.
(c) . . . these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of 1 Vi% per
month after the due date.
(d) . . . the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's
fee to the claimant.

7

See also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 127 (Utah
1997) ("Where an insurer wrongfully refuses to provide a defense, it 'is manifestly
bound to reimburse its insured for the full amount of any obligation reasonably
incurred by h i m . . . . If there be uncertainty as to the nature or extent of the services
reasonably to be rendered by counsel engaged by the insured, that uncertainty must
be resolved against [the] insurer").
26

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-309(5)(c)-(d) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme

Court has acknowledged that courts have no discretion when the legislature adopts
such "mandatory" language.
We are guided in construing the language of the instant statute by
the principle that generally a direction in a statute to do an act is
considered 'mandatory' when consequences are attached to the
failure to act. Conversely, when a statute requires an action to be
taken without prescribing a penalty for failure to so act, the
requirement is not often deemed mandatory.
Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth.. 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted).
The Opinion insisted that "Canal cannot be punished for failure to make
payment on a nonexistent claim." Opinion at f 10. Because the Court of Appeals
erred in its assumption that Regal could not step in the shoes of Chatwin, its initial
mistake was compounded when it assumed that Regal's actions in submitting notice
and proof of her claim did not constitute a claim. Once it is acknowledged by this
Court that Regal was entitled to pursue Chatwin's rights, the Court of Appeals's
Opinion is easily dismissed as arising from a false premise. Id at f 12.

V.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL ATTORNEY
FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED ON THIS
APPEAL.

Appellate courts routinely allow attorney fees on appeal when contracts and/or
statutes expressly provide for fees. See Sprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219,227 (Utah
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App. 1991). Plaintiff is entitled, and hereby demands, to recover its attorney fees
expended for this appeal, and each part of it.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Regal was properly awarded a summary judgment regarding Canal's
obligation to provide PIP benefits to Regal as the subrogee of Chrstina Chatwin. In
addition, accrued interest and Regal's attorney fees were properly awarded because
they are provided for in the Utah no-fault statute and are supported by admissible
evidence submitted to the district court. Judgment entered against Canal should be
enforced, and attorney fees incurred in connection with this appeal should be awarded.
DATED this / /

day of July, 2002.
CARR & WADDOUPS

r ^ —
V^

TgENTj. WADDOUBS^

Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellee
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BENCH, Judge:
H1
Defendant Canal Insurance Company (Canal) appeals from a
summary judgment ruling in favor of Plaintiff Regal Insurance
Company (Regal). The trial court awarded Regal reimbursement of
personal-injury-protection benefits (PIP benefits), costs,
prejudgment interest, and attorney fees. We vacate the award and
remand.
BACKGROUND
H2
In 1995, Donald Boyet borrowed a flatbed tractor trailer
owned by KC Trucking and attached i t to a tractor owned by Boyet
and operated by Kelly Devey. While pulling the borrowed trailer
with Boyet's tractor, Devey struck a pedestrian, Christina
Chatwin. After receiving medical t reatment for injuries caused
by the collision, Chatwin submitted a claim for PIP benefits to
her own automobile insurance carrie r, Regal. Regal paid Chatwin
the PIP benefit limit of $3,000 for her medical expenses.
1[3
Regal subsequently contacted Canal, the insurance carrier
for KC Trucking, and requested reimbursement for the $3,000 PIP
benefits paid to Chatwin. Canal refused Regal ] s request for

reimbursement after concluding that 1) the trailer is not covered
under a personal-injury-protection endorsement (PIP Endorsement)
of the automobile insurance policy issued by Canal to KC
Trucking; and 2) even if the trailer is covered under the PIP
Endorsement, Regal must pursue a claim for reimbursement through
arbitration. Rather than submit to arbitration, Regal filed suit
against Canal, claiming that Canal breached its insurance
contract by refusing "to pay PIP benefits to Christina Chatwin,
or to [Regal] as her subrogee." In addition to seeking $3,000 in
damages plus costs, Regal also sought prejudgment interest and
attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5)(c) to (d)
(1999) .
f4
After considering cross motions for summary judgment, the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Regal. The
trial court rejected Canal's arbitration argument in its final
order and concluded in a minute entry that Chatwin was covered as
an "eligible injured person" under Canal's PIP Endorsement. The
trial court awarded Regal $3,000 for the PIP benefits it had paid
Chatwin, plus costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees.
Canal appeals the trial court's ruling.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
|5
On appeal, we consider two issues. First, Canal asserts
that the trial court erred in not requiring Regal to pursue its
claims through mandatory arbitration under section 31A-22-309(6).
Second, Canal contends that the trial court erred in awarding
Regal attorney fees and prejudgment interest under section 31A22-309(5). Resolution of these issues is a matter of statutory
construction. "Matters of statutory construction are questions
of law that are reviewed for correctness." Platts v. Parents
Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997).
ANALYSIS
%6

This case turns on section 31A-22-309(6), which provides:
Every policy providing personal injury
protection coverage is subject to the
following:
(a) that where the insured under the
policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries
sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury
protection have been paid by another
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insurer . . . the insurer of the person
who would be held legally liable shall
reimburse the other insurer for the
payment, but not in excess of the amount
of damages recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that
reimbursement and its amount shall be
decided by mandatory, binding
arbitration between the insurers.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6). Regal claims that, as Chatwin's
subrogee, it may assert a contractual cause of action against
Canal regarding Canal's obligation to provide PIP benefits to
Chatwin.
i|7
Regal' s argument fails because, with regard to the pay lent
of PIP benefits, it is not subrogated to the rights of Chatwin.
The Utah Supreme Court settled this issue in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). In that case, Ivie was a
passenger in a vehicle insured by Allstate when it was involved
in an accident with another vehicle. See id. at 1198. Allstate
paid Ivie PIP benefits for injuries suffered in the accident.
See id. Ivie subsequently settled a lawsuit that she had filed
against the insurer of the other vehicle involved in the
accident. See id. Ivie refused to reimburse Allstate out of the
settlement proceeds, so Allstate filed suit against Ivie. See
id. Allstate asserted that "it was entitled to subrogation under
the contractual terms of the policy issued on the vehicle in
which Ivie was a passenger to the extent it had paid the PIP
benefits.fl Id.
^8
Resolution of the dispute in Ivie required the supreme court
to interpret the same statutory provision at issue in this case.1
See id. at 1201-02. The court concluded that Allstate was not
subrogated to Ivie's rights, but rather that it had a "limited,
equitable right to seek reimbursement [of PIP benefits] in
arbitration." Id. at 1202; see also Tracy R. Barrus, Comment,
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie: Reimbursement Between Insurers
Under Utah's No-Fault Act, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 379, 384 ("The
court's interpretation of [section 31A-22-309(6)] in Ivie
clarified [that] . . . the reimbursement provision supplants
subrogation procedures that existed prior to the no-fault act.
It is now clear that the no-fault insurer is not subrogated to
the right of its insured.").
1. Section 31A-22-309 (6) "differs slightly from [the statute at
issue in Ivie] in wording but not in substance." Bear River Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33,^2 n.2, 978 P.2d 460.
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H9
Although the posture of the present case differs from Ivie,
Ivie!s cardinal principle still applies: for PIP benefits,
subrogation has been replaced with reimbursement obtained through
arbitration. See Ivie, 606 P.2d at 1204 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (stating that the insured and the insurer must each
pursue their own remedy, and the insurer's remedy is achieved
through arbitration); Barrus, supra, at 388 ("As the court
recognized, the thrust of [section 31A-22-309(6)] is to abrogate
subrogation in the no-fault context and replace it with a system
of reimbursement between insurers."). We therefore conclude that
this dispute may only be resolved through arbitration. It
follows that Regal is not entitled to an award for its litigation
costs.
UlO Finally, we address the trial court's award of prejudgment
interest and attorney fees to Regal. Section 31A-22-309(5)
allows an injured person to seek prejudgment interest and
attorney fees if an insurer fails to timely pay PIP benefits.
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5)(d) (providing that attorney
fees are available to the person entitled to the PIP benefits).
Here, the person entitled to PIP benefits, Chatwin, never
submitted a claim as a pedestrian for those benefits to Canal, as
allowed under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-308 (1999) .2 Instead,
Chatwin, as the named insured in her own automobile insurance
policy, chose to submit her PIP benefit claim to Regal, as
allowed under section 31A-22-308(1). Thus, Canal cannot be
punished for failure to make payment on a nonexistent claim. See
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5)(b) ("Benefits . . . are overdue if
they are not paid within 3 0 days after the insurer receives
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred
during the period.").
1Jll Even if Chatwin had submitted a PIP benefit claim to Canal
as a pedestrian under section 31A-22-308(3), it would be
2.

Section 31A-22-308 provides, in part:
The following may receive benefits under
personal injury protection coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in
an accident involving any motor vehicle

(3) any other natural person whose
injuries arise out of an automobile
accident occurring . . . while a
pedestrian if he is injured in an
accident occurring in Utah involving the
described motor vehicle.
Id. § 31A-22-308 (1) , (3) .
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Chatwin's personal remedy, as the person entitled to PIP
benefits, to pursue an action against Canal for prejudgment
interest and attorney fees under section 31A-22-309 (5) . Regal
could not bring a subrogation suit seeking those penalties
because, as discussed above, Regal is not subrogated to Chatwin's
rights. See Ivie# 606 P.2d at 1202. Rather, Regal has a limited
remedy of seeking reimbursement for paid PIP benefits in
arbitration proceedings under section 31A-22-309(6). The
prejudgment interest and attorney fees provisions of section 31A22-309(5) are therefore inapplicable in this case.
CONCLUSION
^12 Regal may not pursue a subrogation suit against Canal for
the $3,000 in PIP benefits Regal paid to Chatwin. Regal may, of
course, seek reimbursement of the PIP benefits in arbitration
proceedings. Because this dispute properly belongs in
arbitration, Regal is not entitled to an award for litigation
costs. Finally, the prejudgment interest and attorney fees
provisions of section 31A-22-309(5) do not apply.
Ul3 Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's award of $3,000 in
PIP benefits, costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees and
remand to the trial court with instructions to dismiss this
action.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Hl4

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REGAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO. 990904421

:

CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

;

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard on December
21,

2000.

Having

reviewed

the Memoranda

of

the

parties

and

considered the arguments presented by counsel, I conclude that
Regal's insured, Miss Chatwin, was the first party insured under
Canal's policy with K.C. Trucking.

I further conclude that her

status as an "eligible injured person" as defined in the Personal
Injury Protection Coverage section of the Canal policy

is not

affected by the definition of "insured motor vehicle."
Canal contends that the trailer which it insured under its
policy is not an insured motor vehicle for the purposes of personal
injury protection coverage because to satisfy that definition the
named insured is required to maintain security under the provisions
of Title 31A, Utah Code Ann., and no such requirement can be found

REGAL INSURANCE
V. CANAL INSURANCE
in that Title.
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MINUTE ENTRY

I agree with Regal' s contention that this provision

falls within the reach of the Utah Supreme Court's holding in
Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 857 P.2d 922

(Utah 1993),

specifically, its interpretation of Utah Code Ann., Section 31A-21106, which bars the incorporation by reference of provisions not
appearing in the contract of insurance.

The Cullum court rejected

an attempt to incorporate a "step-down" clause by reference.
attempt

to

reduce

coverage

by

incorporation

If an

violates

the

prohibitions of Section 31A-21-106, so must an attempt to exclude
coverage through incorporation.
Regal's

contention

that

incorporation

provisions

have

no

relevance in this setting because the person in the position of
Miss Chatwin would never have occasion to review the insurance
policy is also unavailing.

In Cullum, the court rejected a similar

argument under facts in which the issue concerning the amount of
coverage available to a permissive user of an automobile, a person
who,

like Miss Chatwin, would not be expected

to inspect

the

insurance policy before operating the vehicle.
At oral argument, counsel for Regal indicated that although
the

amount

at

issue

in

this

action

was

originally

$3,000,

plaintiff's prosecution of the action was motivated, at least in
part, by desire to recover attorney's fees.

Although not now

before me, I note that with respect to attorney's fees it is my

REGAL INSURANCE
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intention to reject any application for an award of fees for work
performed in connection with the cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
which culminated in my Minute Entry of May 31, 2000.
Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with
this Minute Entry.
Dated this ^

day of January, 2001.

RONALD'
DISTRI
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MAILING

MINUTE ENTRY

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the

o
foregoing

Minute

Entry,

to

the

following,

,--2-trOT7:
Trent J. Waddoups
Attorney for Plaintiff
8 E. Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-2235
Heinz J. Mahler
Attorney for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, 4 th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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this
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—
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REGAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO. SS0904421

:

CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

:
:

Plaintiff's Application for Attorney's Fees was presented to
me for decision pursuant to a Notice to Submit filed on January 25,
2001.

I reject Canal's contention that this matter is subject to

the binding arbitration provision of Section 31A-22-309 (6), Utah
Code Ann.

This section begins with the introductory language,

"every policy providing personal
subject to the following."
question of whether the Canal

injury protection coverage is

This lawsuit concerns the threshold
policy provided coverage.-- It does

not concern allocation of fault issues which are the subject of the
inter-party arbitration scheme contemplated in this section.
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest in
the amount of $2,606.54. Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of
attorney's fees.

I stand by the observation made in my Minute

Entry of January 2, 2 001 that attorney's fees would not be awarded
for work performed in connection with cross-Motions for Summary

REGAL INSURANCE V.
CANAL INSURANCE
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Judgment decided in my Minute Entry of May 31, 2 0 00.

An award of

fees for work performed in connection with these Motions would not
be

reasonable

because

the

arguments

advanced

in

the

motions

overlooked Utah law which squarely addressed and disposed of the
issues raised. From time to time while engaged in the practice of
law, I ruminated at length over questions which, had I troubled to
look, I would have discovered had been answered by the legislature
in

the

Utah

Code.

These

are

unfortunate

and

understandable

occurrence, but I decline to reward them with awards of attorneys
fees.
I find that plaintiff's counsel reasonably expended 24.6 hours
of work on this matter.

Although plaintiff's Application for Fees

contains no information concerning the training and experience of
plaintiff's

counsel,

I nevertheless

conclude

proposed per hour fee of $150 is reasonable.
attorney's fees in the amount of $3,690.

that

plaintiff's

Accordingly, I award
Lastly, plaintiff is

entitled to recover costs in the amount of $273.46.
Plaintiff's

counsel

shall

prepare

an

Order

consistent with this Minute Entry.
Dated this ]$

_day of February, 2001.

RONALD E. NEHRING
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

and

Judgment
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Minute

Entry,

to the

February, 2 001;

Trent J. Waddoups
Attorney for Plaintiff
8 E. Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Heinz J. Mahler
Attorney for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

following,

this

day of
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